Security defaults¶
Out of the box¶
| Default | |
|---|---|
| Network | Nothing listens until you ask for it: no SSH, and no link-local name answering (LLMNR, mDNS) |
root |
Locked, no password, never logs in over SSH |
| Accounts | The owner's account is created at first boot; there is no default password |
| Passwords | Kept outside the configuration, readable by the system only, so their hashes are never in its history |
| SSH (once on) | Keys only unless passwords are allowed; 3 tries per connection; the owner only; repeated wrong guesses blocked |
| Releases | Images and updates are signed; every update's signature is checked before it is loaded |
| History | A hash-chained ledger of every change, checked at boot and every 15 minutes |
| Footprint | No desktop, no graphical stack, no installer tools on an installed machine |
How changes are controlled¶
- One writer. Only TorqOS's broker writes the machine's configuration. A stray
nixos-rebuildagainst/etc/nixosis refused. - A person approves. A system change shows its comparison and needs a yes at a terminal.
- Nothing hidden. Any Nix file in a change is shown as its raw diff before you approve it.
- Drift is visible. Changes made around TorqOS (with
sudo, for example) are reported byshow system alarms, andrequest system repairputs the machine back. - The privileged code is small Rust, with
unsafeand dead code forbidden by the compiler.
Root and sudo¶
The owner can use sudo, as on any Linux, and a root shell can go around TorqOS. TorqOS does not try
to forbid that; it makes it visible instead, through the alarms and the ledger's hash chain.
Checking a release yourself¶
See Install → Check the download. You need only OpenSSH and coreutils.
Reporting a vulnerability¶
Please report a suspected vulnerability privately to the maintainers rather than in a public issue.